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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his opening brief, Mr. Taylor raised thirteen arguments addressing the twenty-
five claims raised in his first amended petition. The issues raised and briefed include the 
following: 
1. The plea and conviction were not made voluntarily, and that Mr. Taylor was not 
aware that dismissed counts would be used at the penalty phase. Claims I & II 
2. Mr. Taylor suffers from neuropsychiatry injury the was neither discovered nor 
presented at the penalty phase hearing. Additionally, prior counsel failed to 
present and discover additional important mitigation and exculpatory evidence. 
Claims IK, IV, XVII. 
3. There was legal and constitutional error in certain instructions that were given 
and in the court's failure to give certain proposed instructions. Claims IV, V, VI, 
VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, & XIII 
4. The voir dire was unconstitutionally limited and did not result in a fair and 
impartial jury. Claims XIV & XV. 
5. Several of jurors did not meet the constitutional standards of impartiality. 
Claim XVI. 
6. Trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Claims XVIII & XIX. 
7. Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Claim XX. 
8. The trial court failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that Mr. Taylor was 
competent to proceed at both the penalty phase and during the rule 23B hearing. 
Claim XXI. 
9. The trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement of a suspected co-
defendant at the penalty phase. Claim XXII. 
10. The prosecution committed misconduct by introducing prejudicial evidence at 
the penalty phase, by objecting to proper voir dire questions, and by making 
prejudicial arguments during the penalty phase. Claim XXIII. 
2 
11. Trial counsel had a conflict of interest making the penalty phase 
fundamentally unfair. Claim XXIV. 
12. Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Claim XXV. 
This reply brief explains the procedural history of post-conviction proceedings, the 
nature of the case investigation, and concerns expressed to the trial court about the 
funding mechanism in post-conviction cases. It then addresses the admissibility of 
affidavits stricken by the trial court along with an argument in support of admissibility. 
Finally, this brief addresses the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of 
failing to investigate, discover and present important mitigation evidence. The issues 
outlined and argued in the opening brief and post-conviction pleadings address the 
remaining issues raised in this post-conviction proceeding. 
POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
In its description of the history of post-conviction proceedings, the state suggests 
several years pass by before petitions and amended petitions are filed with the trial court. 
Absent from that discussion is a description of the litigation surrounding the lack of 
adequate funding in post-conviction cases. The post-conviction record in this case 
consists of 1983 pages of pleadings, plus several in-court hearings. At the first in-court 
hearing held on April 9, 1998, post-conviction counsel raised the issue of inadequate 
funding to complete investigation. Trial R. 2607, Motion Hearing (4/9/98), 2733.1 There 
1 At that time the administrative cap on expenses was $10,000 to complete all 
investigation in post-conviction proceedings. Utah R. Admin. P. 25-14-5. 
3 
was an extensive discussion with the judge about the inadequacy of funding to properly 
complete a post-conviction investigation.2 Counsel argued that the sum allocated for 
investigation was inadequate to complete a proper mitigation investigation including 
investigation into mental health claims. In the intervening period, counsel filed several ex 
parte pleadings seeking approval of expenses for a mitigation specialist and an 
investigator. Throughout 1999 and 2000, the pleadings and litigation in this case evolve 
around the adequacy of the post-conviction funding scheme, the appropriate procedure for 
seeking funds,3 and what remedy applied once funds were expended. 
As part of the post-conviction proceeding, Judge Noel approved expenses for a 
mitigation investigator in an amount up to $25,000, $10,000 for an investigator, and 
$4,800 for a neuropsychiatry examination. Indeed, the docket entries throughout 1999 
and 2000 show that the litigation involved funding issues. In November of 2000, Mr. 
Taylor moved to hold the Utah Division of Finance in contempt for failing to pay 
2
 In 1998, the duties of post-conviction counsel were defined by ABA Guidelines 
1989: 
Counsel should consider conducting a full investigation of the case, relating to 
both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases. Post-conviction counsel should 
obtain and review a complete record of all court proceedings relevant to the case . . 
3
 Mr. Taylor filed ex parte pleadings seeking funding. The state objected to that 
procedure. Both parties briefed the issue, and the court held several hearings regarding 
that matter. 
4 
"reasonable litigation expenses." Mr. Taylor also petitioned the Division of Finance to 
disburse reasonable litigation expenses. The court ultimately denied all motions relating 
to funding. 
In 2003, counsel filed an affidavit in connection with a request to conduct 
discovery in lieu of responding to the state's motion for summary judgment. Post-
Conviction R. 1052-61. (A copy of that affidavit is attached as Addendum "A"). That 
affidavit detailed the work performed on Mr. Taylor's behalf, the amount of time spent 
working on the case, and additional expenses expended on Mr. Taylor's behalf for which 
reimbursement was not provided. The affidavit also explains that the trial exhibits 
including guns and ballistic evidence are missing from the Summit County Courthouse, 
how the transcripts and files in the co-defendant's case disappeared, and details the 
reasons for which discovery was necessary. The state objected to the motion to conduct 
discovery; the court agreed with the state and denied the request to conduct discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CILWICK AND HILL AFFIDAVITS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN 
EVIDENCE 
In its brief, the state argues that an affidavit prepared by an investigator with 
expertise in death penalty mitigation preparation is inadmissible because "it contained 
primarily inadmissble hearsay." Post-conviction death penalty litigation is not traditional 
civil litigation in the sense that the underlying conviction stems from a criminal 
conviction. Moreover, the process by which death penalty cases reach the court is 
5 
governed by hybrid proceedings delineated by the rules of civil procedure, the Utah Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C.4 The duties of post-
conviction counsel are similarly governed by a series of rules promulgated by the 
American Bar Association and Utah court rules. See American Bar Association 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 
1989 & 2003 (hereinafter "ABA Guidelines 1989" and "ABA Guidelines 2003"); Utah R. 
Crim P. 8. 
In this case, Mr. Cilwick was retained to investigate issues relative to the 
mitigation investigation. See ABA Guideline 2003, 10.15.1.5 Mr. Cilwick has special 
expertise in the investigation of capital cases and performed his role in conformance with 
both case law requirements and ABA standards. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 
(2005) (post-conviction investigation which uncovered previously unknown mitigation 
4
 The Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-100 to-
202, "establishes a substantive remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies . . . ." 
5
 "As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high quality legal 
representation in collateral review proceedings in capital cases requires enormous 
amounts of time energy and knowledge. The field is increasingly complex and ever 
changing. 
[Collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously compiled record but must 
conduct a thorough, independent investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7 
(Subsection E(4)). As demonstrated by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly 
large number of innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to 
provide either a complete or accurate picture of the facts and issues in the case." 
ABA Guidelines 2003, 10.15.1 Commentary, p.p. 127-28. 
6 
results in setting aside death sentence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003)(investigator with expertise in mitigation investigations discovered important 
mitigation evidence and relayed that information at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (post-conviction investigation revealed 
evidence of accused's nightmarish childhood, borderline mental retardation, and good 
conduct in prison and resulted in reversal of death sentence); ABA Guidelines 2003 10.7 
& 10.15.1 ("Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, anything 
in the life of the defendant which might militate against the appropriateness of the death 
penalty for the defendant, penalty phase preparation requires extensive and generally 
unparalleled investigation into personal and family history."). 
The trial court found and the state argues that information uncovered by Mr. 
Cilwick would likely be admissible in a capital sentencing hearing, but the same evidence 
would be inadmissible in a post-conviction proceeding. See State's Brief 29. They argue 
that Rule 56(e) prohibits introduction of hearsay in post-conviction proceedings. Rule 
56(e), however, does not prohibit introduction of hearsay; rather, it limits affidavits to 
"personal knowledge . . . [which] set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." (emphasis added). 
Mr. Taylor contends that Mr. Cilwick's affidavit meets the criteria for 
admissibility pursuant to Rule 56(e). The information in the affidavit was compiled 
7 
pursuant to his duties as a capital mitigation investigator.6 See ABA Guidelines 2003, 
10.7. He learned the information and compiled it as part of the mitigation case. Contrary 
to the state's position, that information is admissible as persuasive mitigation evidence. 
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 604 (1978) ("[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require 
that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of 
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.") (emphasis in original); State 
v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 88 (Utah 1982)(mental health and character evidence are 
admissible as mitigation in a penalty phase). 
As noted in the opening brief, this same procedure was followed in Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) when an investigator like Mr. Cilwick testified in federal 
court about what family members told him relating to the defendant's background.7 
6
 "The assistance of an investigator who has received specialized training is 
indispensable to discovering and developing the facts that must be unearthed at trial or in 
post-conviction proceedings." ABA Guidelines 2003, 4.1, Commentary, p.32. 
7
 The witness in Wiggins was a licensed social worker who "testified concerning 
an elaborate social history report he had prepared containing evidence of the severe 
physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the 
care of a series of foster parents. Relying on state social services, medical, and school 
records, as well as interviews with petitioner and numerous family members, [the social 
worker] chronicled petitioner's bleak life history." Wiggins, at 516. In its brief, the state 
indicates that Wiggins was a Maryland state post-conviction case. It was not a state post-
conviction case, rather, it was a federal post-conviction case initiated in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland. 
8 
There is no state rule in a capital case that limits mitigation evidence in post-conviction 
proceedings in the manner the state argues. The information compiled by Mr. Cilwick is 
admissible in evidence. Mr. Taylor asks this court to overturn the trial court's finding 
striking Mr. Cilwick's affidavit. 
He likewise asks this court to overturn the trial court ruling striking paragraph 11 
of John Hill's affidavit. As outlined in his opening brief, Mr. Taylor contends that 
paragraph 11 states appropriate conclusions based on Mr. Hill's competence and expertise 
as an expert in a capital murder penalty phase. 
II. THE PRETRIAL MENTAL HEALTH EXAMINATIONS FOR 
INSANITY WERE INSUFFICIENT TO UNCOVER EVIDENCE OF BRAIN 
INJURY. 
In its brief, the state summarized the portions of the two reports prepared by Drs. 
Rindflesh and Moench. Those reports were prepared as part of an evaluation to 
determine whether Mr. Taylor met the standard of diminished mental capacity or insanity 
during the trial phase and were not compiled as part of the mitigation investigation. The 
state erroneously suggests that these general mental health evaluations prepared for the 
guilt phase are sufficient to bar any claims of ineffective assistance counsel relating to 
failure to present mitigation in the penalty phase.8 An examination for diminished 
8
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that failure to conduct a thorough 
investigation and present mitigating evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Rompilla v. Beard, 125 s.cT. 2456; Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 
(2003) (the failure to expand the mitigation investigation beyond information in an earlier 
9 
capacity, however, is materially different than an investigation for brain injury.9 See 
Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 103 (3rd Cir. 2005) (general psychological assessments for 
diminished caipacity are often insufficient to detect brain damage); Daniels v. Woodford, 
F.3d 2005 WL 2861623 (9th Cir. 2005)(reliance solely on preliminary 
psychological assessment constitutes ineffective assistance when a subsequent 
investigation employing more extensive psychological tests for penalty phase revealed 
brain damage); Summerlin v. Schriro, All F.3d 623, 642 (9th Cir. 2005) ("considerations 
of [competency and diminished capacity] are far different from those involved in a 
penalty phase mitigation defense."); Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 
1998)(it was unreasonable for trial counsel to base mitigation decisions solely on mental 
health evaluation performed to assess competency at guilt phase) 
In contrast to the preliminary exams performed in 1991, Dr. Gummow performed 
the full neuropsychiatric test battery designed to discover and measure the existence of 
presentence report and division of social services records is ineffective assistance of 
counsel when post-conviction counsel showed there was additional mitigation beyond the 
initial reports); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (The failure to discover and 
present evidence of disadvantaged background, low IQ, abuse at hands of father 
constitutes ineffective assistance); see also State v. Taylor, 947 P. 2d 681, 687 (Utah 
1997) ("the failure to perform an adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective 
assistance of counsel."). 
9
 Dr. Gummow explained in her affidavit that the examinations performed by Drs. 
Rindflesh and Moench as part of the diminished capacity inquiry "are not generally 
accepted as instruments to diagnose brain damage." R. 1384. 
10 
brain damage.10 In this case, both trial and appellate counsel had sufficient notice to 
expand their investigation beyond the rudimentary reports prepared by Drs. Rindflesh and 
Moench. See e.g., Wiggins, at 2532 (the failure to expand the mitigation beyond 
information in an earlier presentence report and division of social services records is 
ineffective assistance of counsel when post-conviction counsel discovered important 
mitigation evidence beyond that contained in the reports). Dr. Moench specifically states 
in his report that the conduct observed here is consistent with someone that has brain 
damage, but the doctor neither had a sufficient history of head injuries to make additional 
recommendations nor performed the neuropsychiatric battery himself to test for brain 
damage. Moreover, the observations of Dr. Moench combined with the mental health and 
substance abuse history should have put a minimally competent lawyer on notice that 
more investigation was necessary. See e.g., Wiggins, at 2537,2542. 
10
 The full neuropsychiatric battery consists of the following tests: California 
Computerized Assessment Package, California Verbal Learning Test-II, Complex Figure 
Test (Myers and Myers), Fifteen Items Test, Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised, 
Halstead-Reitan Battery entire, Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-Ill, Ruff Figural 
Fluency, Stroop Neuropsychological Screening Test, Structured Interview of Reported 
Symptoms, Thurston Word Fluency, Validity Indicator Profile, Test of Malingered 
Memory, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill, Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill, Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test, Wide Range Achievement Test-3 (Arithmetic), and the Woodcock 
Reading Mastery-Revised. Post-Conviction Record, 1385. In contrast, neither Dr. 
Moench nor Dr. Rindflesh conducted any formal psychological testing. It appears that 
Dr. Moench limited his testing to informal memory questions asking about current events, 
names of school teachers, and basic math questions. Post-Conviction Record, 992. Dr. 
Rindflesh limited his psychological assessment to something he described as an "informal 
mental status examination." Post-Conviction R. 104. There is no explanation or 
description of what is measured by an "informal mental status examination." 
11 
The state next contends that the discovery of the additional mitigation evidence 
from family members and evidence of moderate to severe brain damage would not have 
changed the outcome, that the issue regarding mitigation was already decided in earlier 
proceedings, that the new evidence does not meet the standard for unusual circumstances, 
and that trial and appellate counsel's "mitigation decisions met constitutional standards." 
State Brief, 41. 
The procedural bars outlined in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and 
corresponding case law are intended to prohibit petitioners from re-raising issues 
previously decided on direct appeal. See Carter v. Galetka, AA P.3d 626, 629 (Utah 2001). 
This Court explained how the unusual circumstances test is applied in post-conviction 
proceedings: 
A petition for habeas corpus is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or sentence 
and is not a substitute for direct appellate review. As a result, issues raised and 
disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or sentence cannot be raised again in a 
petition for habeas corpus. Such issues are dismissed as an abuse of the writ, 
without ruling on the merits. Additionally, issues that could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not be raised for the first time in a 
habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual circumstances. 
Carter, at 629 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the state's position, this Court will still review claims whenever 
unusual circumstances exist even if the claim was or could have been raised before. 
Garner v. Holden, 888, P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994)("unusual circumstances" may 
overcome procedural bar); Carter v. Galetka, AA P.3d at 633 ("To determine unusual 
12 
circumstances, a petitioner must show that there was 'an obvious injustice or a substantial 
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'" quoting Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 
1035 (Utah 1989)). This Court will still review seemingly defaulted claims "to ensure that 
substantial justice is done." Carter, 44 P.3d at 634. 
Where, as here, "a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise an issue on appeal, [this Court] examine[s] the merits of the omitted 
issue." Carter, 44 P.3d at 639.u There is no procedural default because the courts seek 
to ensure fundamental fairness and substantial justice is done. Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101,1114-16 (Utah 1983)(Stewart, J., concurring in result)(cited favorably in 
Carter). 
The "unusual circumstance" in this case is the ineffective performance of both trial 
and appellate counsel. The state court decision here "was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States...," and thus meets the standard for unusual circumstances. 
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. at 2462; Wiggins, at 520; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 
As outlined more extensively in the opening brief, the second amended petition, 
and memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, both prior attorneys were 
11
 The state suggests that petitioner failed to raise and preserve the claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and contend that the only issue before this court is 
whether appellate counsel was ineffective. Throughout the litigation, petitioner has 
always alleged that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Post-Conviction R. 
582-86, 1319, 1366. 
13 
ineffective for foiling to conduct an appropriate mitigation investigation and for failing to 
present the persuasive mitigation evidence to the jury.12 It was unreasonable for trial 
counsel to end the investigation when he did as the history of prior mental health 
problems and reference to behavior consistent with brain damage should have "led a 
reasonably competent attorney to investigate further." Wiggins, at 2541-42.l3 The 
discovery and presentation of the evidence would have changed the outcome of the 
proceedings below. See e.g. Williams, 529 U.S. at 399 (u[T]he entire post-conviction 
12
 The state characterizes Mr. Taylor's argument as one of "investigating to 
exhaustion" all possible mitigation evidence. Mr. Taylor has never argued that as a 
standard and that is not the standard recognized by either this Court or the United States 
Supreme Court. Rather he simply argues that the standards for investigation are set by the 
ABA standards and Supreme Court case law. See Wiggins, at 2541-42 (Counsels' 
"decision to end their investigation when they did was neither consistent the professional 
standards that prevailed in 1989, nor reasonable in light of the evidence uncovered in the 
social services records - evidence that would have led a reasonably competent attorney to 
investigate further.") ABA Guidelines 1989 11.4.1; ABA Guidelines 2003 10.7. The 
state neither cites to nor acknowledges the existence of the ABA Guidelines which the 
Supreme Court has long referred to as "guides to determining what is reasonable." 
Wiggins, at 2537. 
13
 The state also suggests that petitioner argued that a so-called "boy next door" 
mitigation theme is "constitutionally unacceptable as a matter of law." Petitioner made 
no such argument. Petitioner merely compared the case of Williams v. Taylor to the 
present case pointing out the similarities in both counsels' deficient performances. In 
Williams, as in this case, both trial counsel did little investigation in preparation for the 
penalty phase. Like here, Williams' attorney called witnesses including family members 
to talk about Williams' good character and argued that he was a "nice boy." Both trial 
attorneys told the jury that it was difficult to find a reason to spare his client's life, and in 
both cases, the post-conviction investigation revealed significant and important mitigation 
evidence that would have a made a difference in the sentence. In Williams, the Supreme 
Court reversed petitioner's death sentence finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present mitigation evidence similar to evidence in this case. 
14 
record viewed as a whole and cumulative of mitigation evidence presented originally, 
raised a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing hearing would have been 
different if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the 
available evidence."). 
The state further contends that if Mr. Taylor tried to present "mental health issues" 
it would "open the door to damaging evidence from the Moench and Rindflesh reports." 
Contrary to the representation in the state's brief, petitioner argued that the information in 
the Moench and Rindflesh reports was inadmissible because it failed to meet the 
standards of reliability for admission in a capital sentencing phase. See Memorandum in 
Support of Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p.p. 30-33.14 Moreover, counsel 
was never in a position to make a reasoned choice about the risk of admission of the 
damaging evidence because he failed to pursue an appropriate mitigation investigation. 
See Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2460 (attorney has a duty to conduct mitigation investigation 
which includes possible challenges to aggravation evidence); Wiggins, at 2538-39 quoting 
14
 There is a question about whether anything in the reports could be used at a 
penalty phase since there are procedural safeguards in place that limit the use of section 
77-14-4 examinations. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 370 (Utah 1995)(admission of 
statements made in relation to an examination to determine diminished capacity "should 
be limited to rebutting an insanity defense and may not be used to show that the defendant 
engaged in the conduct charged ") Herrera also points out that a defendant is entitled 
to have the court review defendant statements in camera before the information is 
presented to the jury. In this case, there was no effort to limit admission of the 
information as trial counsel stated he never moved to exclude possibly prejudicial 
evidence but simply waited to hear the evidence before objecting at trial. 
15 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690-91 (1984) ("'strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."); Soffar v. Dretke, 368 
F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2004)("an actual failure to investigate cannot be excused by a 
hypothetical decision not to use its unknown results"). In short, he was never in a 
position to weigh the risk of admission of some bad evidence in exchange for the 
compelling nature of the mitigation evidence that did exist. See Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 
919, 942-44 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting district court's finding that mental health evidence 
could be harmful to defendant). 
The state next suggests that the evidence of brain damage here is somehow less 
compelling or important than the brain damage evidence discovered in the federal cases 
cited in Mr. Taylor's opening brief.15 Contrary to the state's argument, Dr. Gummow 
explains how the brain injury evidence "constitutes powerful and persuasive mitigation 
evidence." Post-Conviction R. 1388; Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 452 (6th Cir. 
2001)("We find, given Petitioner's personal background, psychological history, and 
15
 As noted in Smith vMullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004), the state's 
characterization of brain damage as unimportant mitigation evidence "reveal[s] a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose for which such mitigation evidence would 
have been presented." Moreover, the state presented no evidence challenging the finding 
of moderate brain damage. Dr. Gummow explained the importance of brain injury as 
mitigation in this case: "Although economic limitations make it currently impossible to 
complete the mental health investigation, the information presently known still constitutes 
powerful and persuasive mitigation evidence." Post-Conviction R. 1388. 
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potential organic brain dysfunction, that it is reasonably probable that the presentation of 
even a substantial subset of the mitigating evidence detailed above, would be such that at 
least one juror could have found he did not deserve the death penalty.") 
They also try to cast the trial court's finding in a manner different than stated in 
Findings and Conclusions. The trial court specifically found that 
after incurring substantial expense in expert witness fees and undergoing fourteen 
hours of psychological examination, petitioner still cannot demonstrate to the 
Court that his moderate brain damage is somehow related to the criminal conduct 
involved in this case. It may be true, as Dr. Gummow opines, that brain damage is 
relevant in explaining violent or out-of-control behavior, and "that a brain-injured 
person often cannot fully appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform 
his conduct to requirements of law." However, Dr. Gummow has not opined that 
petitioner was unable to do so at the time of the homicides, or that he acted under 
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court also notes that, had 
trial counsel raised mental health issues, the door likely would have been opened 
to Dr. Moench's and Dr. Rindflesh's reports, which contain substantial 
information that is prejudicial to petitioner.16 
Post-Conviction R. 1952 (emphasis added). 
The court's finding requires a defendant to first "demonstrate . . . tha t . . . brain 
damage is somehow related to the criminal conduct.. . ," before it becomes admissible at 
a penalty phase. The trial court here thus created a "nexus" test for admission of 
mitigation evidence which is simply inconsistent with and contrary to clearly established 
16
 Neither the trial court nor the state articulate how the so-called "prejudicial" 
information contained in the reports would become admissible at a penalty phase in light 
of this Court's ruling in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) and other cases 
limiting admissibility of prejudicial evidence at a penalty phase. 
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federal law. Tenard v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 2562 (2004).17 The Tenard Court specifically 
rejected such a nexus test. Tenard, 124 S.Ct. at 2570 quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 114 (1982) ("Virtually no limits are placed on relevant mitigating evidence a 
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances."); see Skipper v. 
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)(A sentencing body may not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (even though the 
petitioner's evidence of good conduct in jail did "not relate specifically to petitioner's 
culpability for the crime he committed, there is no question but that such [evidence]... 
would be 'mitigating1 in the sense that [it] might serve fas a basis for a sentence less than 
death.'). 
The state next contends that any evidence of Mr. Taylor's lesser role in the 
homicides was overcome by forensic evidence and eyewitness testimony. Consistent with 
the arguments above, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel were in a position to 
17
 Before the summary judgment order became final, the United States Supreme 
Court issued Tenard v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 2570 (2004) which rejected the Fifth 
Circuit's nexus test as a prerequisite to admission of mitigation evidence. On August 2, 
2004, petitioner submitted a pleading styled objections to findings and conclusions, Post-
Conviction R. 1898, informing the court of the Supreme Court's decision in Tenard. 
Post-Conviction R. 1903-04. The trial court reviewed the objections "in some detail" and 
apparently ignored the Tenard holding finding the Tenard objections "to be inappropriate. 
. . ." Post-Conviction R. 1970. 
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evaluate the viability of a lesser role mitigation claim, because neither attorney 
investigated or discovered evidence consistent with a lesser role. Soffar v. Dretke, 368 
F.3d 441 amended 391 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2004)(counsel was ineffective for failing to 
retain a ballistics expert, who could have established that the crime scene was consistent 
with the surviving victim's statement and inconsistent with defendant's confession). 
As outlined in greater detail in his opening brief, the post-conviction investigation 
reveals that the co-defendant, Edward Deli played a leadership role in the homicides. The 
state insists that if Mr. Taylor presented the co-defendant as the leader through family 
members and statements of eyewitnesses, then admissions about the shooting made in the 
psychological statements would be admissible.18 Neither trial counsel nor appellate 
counsel, however, were ever prepared to address this issue simply because neither 
investigated the viability of this mitigation evidence. 
The failure to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation, given the mitigation 
evidence known in 1990 and 1991, is neither reasonable nor strategic. Wiggins, at 2537, 
2542 ("any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads 
was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses . . . .") . When 
18
 An attorney nonetheless has the duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
facts underlying those admissions. See ABA Guidelines 1989 ; ABA Guidelines 2003 
10.7. A recent study conducted as part of the innocence project found that in twenty-three 
percent of the cases, the client confessed guilt, notwithstanding his actual innocence. See 
ABA Guidelines 2003 10.7 note 201. Even if Mr. Taylor was the shooter, it would not 
preclude an argument that he was acting at the direction of the co-defendant. 
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viewing the record as whole, here, it is clear that counsel "put on a halfhearted mitigation 
case." Wiggins, at 2538. Counsel called Mr. Taylor's father who was ambivalent about 
the death penalty, Mr. Taylor who was concerned about giving evidence against the co-
defendant which made him appear uncooperative and evasive, and James Holland, a 
fellow death row inmate whose testimony suggested that Mr. Taylor would be 
transformed into a more violent and angry person if placed in prison for life.19 He 
presented no evidence addressing any of the statutory mitigating circumstances, even 
though substantial evidence of brain injury and mental health evidence existed. See 
Addendum "B" (outlining the known clues and mitigation evidence that existed in 1990). 
He did nothing to combat or challenge the aggravating circumstances, see Rompilla, 125 
S. Ct. at 2462, and conducted no investigation to show that the co-defendant, who 
received a 5 to life sentence, was more culpable and most likely delivered the fatal 
gunshots to both victims. Prior counsels' failures in the penalty phase "resulted from 
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment." Wiggins, at 2537. 
"In order for counsel's inadequate performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment 
violation, petitioner must show that counsel's failures prejudiced his defense." Wiggins, 
at 2542 quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Both in Wiggins and in this case, counsel 
19
 Neither party in this case was prepared prior to the penalty phase to present 
evidence of future dangerousness. After Holland testified, however, the prosecution used 
that evidence repeatedly and effectively in closing argument to argue for the death 
penalty. Holland's testimony was actually harmful to Mr. Taylor's case. 
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failed to discover and present "powerful" mitigation evidence. See Addendum "B." The 
Supreme Court found that presentation of Wiggins' severe privation at an early age, 
physical and sexual abuse, homelessness, and diminished mental capacities "'might well 
have influenced the jury's appraisal' of Wiggins' moral culpability." Wiggins, at 2544 
quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 398. Similarly, discovery of the compelling 
mitigating evidence, here, which includes evidence of brain injury that directly impacts 
moral culpability, see Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2002), substance 
abuse issues previously outlined and argued, the fact that Mr. Taylor is a less culpable 
participant, and family witnesses who describe Mr. Taylor as a generally peaceful and 
compassionate person are all factors that tip the balance in favor of life. See Wiggins, at 
2543. At a minimum, Mr. Taylor is entitled to a new penalty phase. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor asks this Court to reverse Mr. Taylor's conviction and remand the 
matter to the trial court for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Taylor asks this Court to 
reverse Mr. Taylor's death sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this of December, 2005 
^A<1><u£\/^ 
ICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Von Lester Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief to Thomas Brunker, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, this g ^ ^ a y of December 2005. 
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Warden of the Utah State Prison, 
State of Utah 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD P. MAURO 
Case No. 990902315 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Richard P. Mauro, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I have 
been duly licensed to practice law since May 1989. 
2. I was appointed by Judge Ronald Nehring to represent Von Lester Taylor in state post-
conviction proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-109. At the time I was appointed to 
represent Mr. Taylor I was qualified, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, to represent 
indigent defendants in capital trial proceedings. Since my appointment in this case, Rule 8 has 
been amended to include provisions for appointment of post-conviction counsel. Although I meet 
many of the criteria for appointment of post-conviction counsel, I have not, prior to this case, 
represented anyone in habeas or post-conviction proceedings. 
3. Since my appointment in this case, I have spent over 450 hours on this case. That time 
has been spent obtaining and reviewing the file, reading and reviewing penalty phase transcripts, 
reading and reviewing the Rule 23B pleadings and transcripts, drafting the original petition and 
first amended petition; drafting and compiling several ex parte motions, ex parte affidavits, and ex 
parte orders; drafting and filing discovery requests and subpoenas; meeting with investigators, 
mitigation specialists, and mental health experts; reading pertinent information and learned 
treatises pertaining to mitigation and mental health issues; meeting with Mr. Taylor at the Utah 
State Prison; traveling to and conversing with court personnel in Summit County; and attending 
court hearings in the District Court. 
4. The funding mechanisms for payment of counsel and investigation are wholly 
inadequate. At this point, I have been paid a total of $10,000 in attorney fees. I have paid 
$692.00 of that amount toward investigation and 709.50 to a law clerk for legal research. That 
results in a rate of hourly compensation of $19.10 which is inadequate for me to meet basic office 
overhead. My customary billing rate per hour has been $150 per hour and is presently $175 per 
hour. The hourly billing rate for death penalty habeas work in federal court is $125 per hour. It 
is a sufficient burden for me to allot sufficient time to work on this complex matter given that I am 
a sole practitioner and must meet office overhead and salaries from sources other than this case. 
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5. Moreover, the amount allocated for investigation and experts is woefully inadequate to 
conduct anything but the most perfunctory of investigations. The present case is very complex 
from a scientific and mental health standpoint. No prior attorney has conducted any mitigation 
investigation prior to this point. A mitigation work up is a very difficult and complex 
undertaking. It initially requires the identification and compilation of a detailed document and 
witness list. The list includes vital records including birth records, medical records, school 
records, work records, driver license records, department of corrections records, and court 
records. The retained mitigation specialist, Mary Goody, has identified thirty-eight such sources 
of information. Ms. Goody has either contacted or attempted to conduct all thirty-eight sources. 
She has received records from some agencies, a few agencies have indicated that no records exist, 
while a number of agencies, particularly school administrations, medical and corrections agencies 
require follow-up contact and investigation. 
6. It is absolutely necessary to obtain the school, medical, and department of corrections 
records in this case. I know that additional clues of brain injury can be found in school, medical 
and correction records. Indeed, here, we know of anecdotal evidence consistent with brain injury 
as a result of several reported events at school, plus information gleaned from interviews with 
family members. 
7. I know that clearly established state and federal law requires me, as part of my post-
conviction duties, to investigate and present the mitigating evidence of brain injury that exists in 
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this case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (counsel ineffective in penalty phase when he 
limited testimony to defendant's mother and some psychiatric evidence, but failed to investigate or 
discover other important mental health evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments require that a sentencing jury not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's life and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the accused proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death); Battenfiled v. 
Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (trial counsel's preparation for penalty phase was 
constitutionally defective when he was unaware of various mitigation strategies, and was 
unprepared to rebut aggravating factors argued by the state); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F. 3d 1247 
(9th Cir. 2002)(even though trial counsel consulted with two psychologists and a licensed clinical 
social worker before trial, his failure to consult with a neuropsychologist constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2002) (failure to present 
evidence of possible mitigating evidence consisting of brain injury and/or mental retardation 
constitutes inefifective assistance of counsel); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah 1997) (the 
failure to investigate potential mitigation leading to discovery of mental health or mental 
disturbance evidence is ineffective assistance of counsel). I am presently conducting follow-up 
investigation regarding this issue. 
8. In this case, I am seeking permission from the court to obtain Mr. Taylor's Utah 
Department of Corrections file. In 1998, Mary Goody, the mitigation specialist retained in this 
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case, requested these records from the Department of Corrections. The Department informed her 
that the requested records were protected under the Government Records Access Management 
Act, and would not be disclosed without a court order. Additionally, I have contacted the 
Department requesting these records and was informed that such records would not be released 
without a court order. 
9. The specific reports and observations regarding prior diagnosed mental illnesses and 
other unusual behavior is material to the claims outlined in the petition. It is relevant in 
establishing at least two statutory mitigating circumstances: 1. that the offense was committed 
while accused was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and 2. the 
accused's capacity "to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirement of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(b) & (d) (1990); see Brownlee Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1073-74 
(11th Cir. 2002)(failure to investigate evidence of possible brain injury constitutes ineffective 
assistance as such evidence addresses two statutory mitigators: 1. acting under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance; and 2. inability to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct or conform 
conduct to requirements of law). I know from my training and experience that documents in 
these files will include mental health testing documents; test records; notes of observations, 
diagnoses, and behavior compiled by mental health personnel and other people at the Department 
of Corrections; medical records; observations and records of behavior in jail and prison; and 
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other important documents and information. This information is likely to lead to the discovery of 
additional important mitigating evidence. Experts who specialize in neuropsychiatry testing 
depend upon this information in assessing and evaluating brain injured people. See Caro, 280 F.3d 
at 1254. 
10. I have personally traveled to the Summit County Courthouse four times seeking to 
review the trial exhibits in the Taylor and Deli cases. The court has some of the exhibits in the 
Taylor case; other penalty phase exhibits are missing. The most critical missing exhibits include 
the guns and ballistic evidence. Court personnel believe that these items are located at the 
Summit County Sheriffs office. I personally contacted the evidence custodian at the Summit 
County Sheriffs Office who informed me that the Sheriffs Office dose not have the guns or 
ballistics evidence. I believe, based upon reading the police reports and state discovery, that 
physical evidence (e.g., guns, ballistics, pictures and physical evidence) are important in 
developing the statutory mitigating circumstance of minor participant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
207(2)(f)(1990). I base this upon my review of the ballistic and autopsy evidence showing that 
the lethal injuries were caused by the .44 caliber pistol, that all the prosecution witnesses testified 
that co-defendant Edward Deli carried that gun, that no one saw Deli give the gun to Mr. Taylor, 
and Linae Tiede watched Mr. Deli reload the .44 caliber after her mother and grandmother were 
shot. Moreover, although the Deli file is missing (see below), newspaper articles written during 
the Deli trial described the prosecutor's argument that Edward Deli was the only person observed 
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with the .44 caliber weapon. 
11. Although I am presently without funds to hire a ballistics person, I have nonetheless 
contacted a ballistics expert. Obviously, a ballistics expert would assist greatly in the 
development and explanation of this mitigating evidence. Even without the expert, however, I 
still believe that production and review of this evidence will support the statutory mitigating 
circumstance identified above. 
12. I have attempted to obtain the Edward Deli file and transcripts. According to Summit 
County Court personnel, that file is missing. I have written to and made phone contact with 
Martin Gravis, Edward Deli's attorney. Mr. Gravis informed me that he sent his entire file, 
including pleadings and transcripts, to Edward Deli at the Utah State Prison. I believed that 
information contained in this file is important in supporting the claims outlined in the petition. I 
know from reading the newspaper reports, written during Deli's trial, that all of the eyewitnesses 
testified that Deli was the only one seen with .44 caliber, that he was observed reloading that gun 
after the shootings of Ms. Tiede and her mother, and that he told Linae Tiede that he was as good 
with a knife as he was with a gun. That information is important to the development of the claims 
identified in the petition. 
13.1 know from training and experience that information contained within the 
prosecutor's file might reveal mitigating or exculpatory evidence. I know from review of the file 
that this case generated a high degree of emotion and anger directed toward Mr. Taylor and Mr. 
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Deli. I also know that Mr. Levine made no requests for discovery. Although I know of no 
specific evidence of wrongdoing, I also know that the emotion generated by this case might lead 
to the withholding of exculpatory and/or mitigating evidence. I know of least one capital case in 
Utah where the prosecutor failed to disclose Brady material regarding an important witness. See 
State of Utah v. Elroy Tillman, Case No. 010908894. This information was first disclosed just a 
few weeks before Mr. Tillman's scheduled execution. Accordingly, I am seeking permission from 
the court to seek discovery of the prosecutor's file in this case. 
14. While reviewing the file in this case, I learned that trial counsel was suspended by the 
Utah State Bar for violations of the Utah Rules of Profession Conduct as a result of deficiencies in 
the representation of Mr. Taylor and a second capital client named James Holland. I have both 
spoken to Bar counsel and issued a subpoena requesting copies of Mr. Levine's Utah State Bar 
disciplinary file. I know from training and experience that information contained in this file will 
undoubtedly contain important evidence to support the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Accordingly, I am seeking permission from the court to seek discovery of the Utah State Bar's 
disciplinary file regarding Elliot Levine. 
15.1 know from training and experience that criminals like Scott Manley will do and say 
anything to stay out of prison. At the time Scott Manley gave his statement to police regarding 
this case, he was on parole, undoubtedly hoping to remain free. I also know that experienced 
criminals like Manley will often seek favorable treatment from governmental agencies in exchange 
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for information provided against other defendants. Evidence of requests for consideration or 
favorable treatment can often be found in files compiled by the probation officers or others in the 
Department of Corrections. While I believe that the court erred in allowing the admission of 
Manley's statement at the penalty phase, see Lilly v. Virginia^ 527 U.S. 116 (1999), I nonetheless 
know a minimally competent capital attorney should have been prepared to attack Manley's 
credibility. I have sought Manley's Utah Department of Corrections file, but was informed that 
the Department would not disclose the file without an order from the court. Accordingly, I am 
seeking permission from the court to seek discovery of Scott Manley's Department of Corrections 
file. 
16. There is considerable additional investigation to complete in this case, although I do 
not have the necessary funds to complete that investigation. There is approximately three 
thousand dollars left to complete the investigation in this case. I have communicated with experts 
and investigators in this case to complete additional investigation and testing. I anticipate that the 
$20,000 allocated for investigation will soon be depleted. There is still considerable investigation 
to be completed which I cannot complete without additional funds from the court. Nonetheless, I 
am seeking permission from the court to conduct discovery in areas identified above and in the 
accompanying motion and memorandum. 
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Dated this /3 day of January, 2003. 
/
^^S3 
ichard P. Mauro 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED before me this & day of January, 2003. 
My Commission Expires: 
CHRISTINE F. FORD 
mm/PUBUC'STAlEotUTAH 
* E A S T 400 SOUTH 
•ALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
COMM.EXR 1-19-2006 
Notary Public, Residing in Salt Lake County 
CERTD7ICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD P. MAURO 
was mailed, via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on the / *> day of January, 2003 to: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Assistant United States Attorney 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 




have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to 
abstract from mistakes, and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.12 
AcBtins, 122 S.Ct. at 2241. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet found it to be cruel and unusual to execute brain 
injured people, presentation of brain injury constitutes equally critical mitigating evidence. 
Compare Adkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2252, with Cam, 280 F.3d at 1251 (explaining how brain damage 
may hinder judgment and cause aggressiveness). 
D. Mitigation Here. 
In this case, there were sufficient clues to alert a minimally competent capital attorney to 
conduct further investigation for the presence of brain injury. Those known factors were as 
follows: 
1. Letter sent to Washington County Judge by Sister. In 1989, Kay Auble, Mr. 
Taylor's older sister, wrote a compelling letter to the Washington County Judge in relation 
to Mr. Taylor's case in that county. That letter was attached to the presentence report. In 
that letter, Ms. Auble expressed grave concerns about her brother's mental health 
problems which were evident at an early age. She explained that when young, Von "had a 
lot of problems." When she suggested to her mother that Von "wasn't stable," and 
needed professional help, her pleas were ignored. She described Von as either depressed 
or paranoid since an early age, and felt that he needed psychiatric intervention. She 
described Von as a loner, even in group situations, that he "did not fit in," and did not 
conform to norms. She explained that as he got older, he withdrew even more. She 
observed him to be "depressed and disturbed" in 1988, approximately eighteen months 
before this incident. She explained that Von began drinking alcohol in junior high school, 
and since then things have gotten progressively worse. Finally, she described her brother 
as a follower, who spent considerable time in his room. Contrary to information in one of 
the reports Ms. Auble reported that Von never participated in devil worshiping. 
2. Letter sent to Washington County Judge by parents. Mr. Taylor's father also sent a 
letter to the Washington County judge explaining that Von never graduated from high 
12
 A brain injured person also lacks the ability to logically reason, control impulses and 
understand the reactions of others. 
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school, had difficulty holding a job and experienced "psychological problems" as a result 
of a prior accident leaving a facial scar. 
3. Information provided by Robert Taylor, Von Taylor's Brother. In 1989, a little 
more than a year prior to this case, Robert Taylor told Diagnostic Investigator, Robyn 
Williams that his brother, Von Taylor, "has some pretty serious mood swings." He also 
described a prior suicide attempt. 
4. History of head injuries, (a) In 1967, when Mr. Taylor was two years old, he fell 
down a fight of stairs in his home while trying to retrieve a toy. He was hospitalized as a 
result of that fall. This injury may have caused brain injury as it is known that Mr. Taylor 
has moderate brain damage, (b) In 1977, Mr. Taylor suffered a severe facial injury when 
an aerosol can exploded in campfire imbedding shrapnel into his face and arm. Doctors 
performed plastic surgery to repair the injuries to his face. This injury may have caused or 
contributed to the brain damage, (c) In 1979, Mr. Taylor was hospitalized when the pick 
up truck in which he was a passenger rolled over. He was thrown from the pick up truck 
in this accident. He began skipping school after suffering the injuries in this accident. This 
accident may have caused or contributed to the brain damage. Mr. Taylor underwent 
surgery to repair the injuries, (d) On April 8, 1983 in Weber County, Utah. Mr. Taylor 
crashed his motorcycle and was transported by ambulance to McKay Dee Hospital, (e) 
When Mr. Taylor was in elementary school, his brother John was pulling him along in a 
plastic saucer sled. Mr. Taylor was standing in the saucer while being pulled along the 
sidewalk. He fell face first landing on his forehead, causing a "doorknob-sized" bump on 
his forehead (f) In 1989, while at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Mr. Taylor hit his 
head on a metal stairwell. After that incident, up to today, he suffers from migraine 
headaches and has occasionally taken medication for that malady, (g) During the 1970's 
and 1980's, Mr. Taylor spent summers working on the family farm in Idaho. He was 
repeatedly exposed to pesticides and other farm chemicals. Family members recall use of 
chemicals in controlling insects, various poisons used to control rodents and gophers, and 
use of fertilizers. These various chemicals were applied by hand, spray, and crop duster. 
Mr. Taylor was repeatedly exposed to these chemicals. At times Mr. Taylor was standing 
under the crop duster as it sprayed chemicals on the field; at other times Mr. Taylor had 
direct contact with chemicals when they were sprayed by hand or when he changed the 
sprinkler heads immediately after the fields were sprayed. Mr. Taylor's sisters recall 
suffering from headaches and nausea when the pesticides were sprayed onto the field. See 
Cilwick Affidavit. 
5. History of migraine headaches. Mr. Taylor suffers from recurrent migraine 
headaches which began in 1989. Members of the Taylor family reported that Mr. Taylor 
began experiencing migraine headaches after hitting his head on a steel post while 
incarcerated after being arrested for the 1989 burglary. There is also a maternal history of 
migraine headaches in his family, plus three siblings suffer from migraine headaches. 
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6. History of Substance Abuse. There is both a maternal and paternal history of 
alcoholism in the Taylor family. See Affidavit of Ted Cilwick. Thomas Taylor's father 
was an alcoholic who died of cirrhosis of the liver. Mrs. Taylor also had a family history 
of alcoholism and what appears to be depression.13 Four of Mr. Taylor's brothers have 
been treated for alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental health problems. Steven Taylor, a 
brother with whom Von was close to in the late 1980's, is completely disabled because of 
alcohol, drugs and mental health problems. He receives social security benefits and cannot 
work. Steven's alcohol, drug use, and mental health problems were widely known in 
1989, and are mentioned in report prepared by Dr. Moench. John Taylor, who is two 
years older than Von, was placed in an inpatient psychiatric unit for mental health 
problems and alcoholism. He has been prescribed various anti-depression medication 
including Zoloft and Wellbutrin. Thomas, who is a few years older than Von, has also 
undergone inpatient alcohol and mental treatment at the LDS Dayspring Program. He is 
an admitted alcoholic who also suffers from clinical depression. Von's sister, Cheryl Nix, 
has been treated for clinical depression and panic disorder and takes Zoloft, Trazadone, 
and Paxil, and may be obsessive compulsive. Von's other sister, Sana Johnson, has been 
treated for clinical depression and takes various anti-depressant medication. Robert 
Taylor, Mr. Taylor's older brother, has also been treated for clinical depression. See 
Cilwick Affidavit. 
Von Taylor was drinking alcohol frequently during the late 1980's. In 1989, David 
G. Christensen, an investigator for the Utah Office of Adult Probation and Parole believed 
that Mr. Taylor had "a possible health reaction to alcohol." Christensen based this on 
three factors: (1) "a history of diabetes in the [Taylor] family and [Von's] inability to gain 
weight. . . indicating] . . . diabetes or hypoglycemia . . . ;" (2) Von became "crazy" when 
he drank alcohol; and (3) Von had been drinking heavily on the night of the burglary at the 
Leavitt's home. See Presentence Investigation Report, Case No. 1991, p. 10. Christensen 
recommended that Mr. Taylor undergo a ninety day diagnostic evaluation "[b]ecause of 
[Mr. Taylor's] exceptional family relationships and extended arrest-free history and 
perceived psychological problems . . . ." Mr. Taylor's consumption of alcohol was 
consistent with the maternal and paternal history of alcoholism in the family. 
The 1989 Presentence Report contained a section styled "Substance Abuse." A 
subsection of that category contained an explanation of Mr. Taylor's alcohol use history: 
Mr. Taylor reports he began drinking alcoholic beverages at approximately age 
fourteen. He reports this drinking was to become accepted by peers. He was 
drinking three to four beers on weekends, but reported when he drank he became 
"crazy." He quit drinking as a teenager, but began drinking again after he became 
depressed in St. George, because he could not find employment and was having 
13
 Mrs. Taylor describes conduct of parents and grandparents that today would be 
recognized as clinical depression, although because family members would be over one hundred 
years old, there was no formal diagnosis. Moreover, as Mrs. Taylor, who is nearly eighty 
explained, people didn't go to doctors for those things back in those days. 
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problems with bills. He was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time 
he committed the present offense. It is felt, because of the defendant's actions 
regarding the present offense and his past alcohol abuse problems he would benefit 
from alcohol abuse treatment and counseling. 
Presentence Report, Case 1991, p. 7. 
7. History of Suicide attempts, (a) The earliest known suicide attempt occurred in 
approximately 1989, before his arrest for burglary, as observed by his brother, Robert 
Taylor, (b) Von Taylor was placed on suicide watch at the Washington County Jail in 
1989, as jail personnel noted that he was "very depressed and contemplating suicide." He 
was twice placed in isolation because of suicidal tendencies. He was visited by Dr. 
Kliarsky for suicide and mental assessment while in the Washington County Jail. There 
was a note placed in his file at the ninety day diagnostic unit that unit staff should be aware 
of a possible suicide risk, (c) At the Utah State Prison Captain Clark referred Mr. Taylor 
for suicidal reassessment and he was placed on modified watch for suicide, (d) Mr. Taylor 
attempted suicide on the opening morning of the penalty phase hearing by slitting his 
wrists. The proceedings were stopped, and Dr. Mark Rindflesh was called to examine Mr. 
Taylor. Although Dr. Rindflesh found Mr. Taylor competent to proceed, he nonetheless 
cautioned against prescribing medication because "it would offer [Mr. Taylor] an 
opportunity to save up a supply . . . ," for another suicide attempt. Mr. Taylor's sisters 
remember Von's arms being heavily bandaged during the penalty phase hearing; (e) At 
the Rule 23B hearing counsel asked for a stay of proceedings noting that Mr. Taylor was 
"either in some sort or depression or remorse or something. His eyes are teary, he's crying 
and he is - although he's responsive to my questions in the sense of being oriented as to 
time and space, he is answering questions by telling me about personal feelings instead of 
being responsive to the questions that I'm asking." Rule 23B, Vol. Ill, 5, 2178. Mr. 
Taylor responded to questions by stating: "I'm too depressed. I'm too depressed. I can't 
do this anymore." Rule 23B,Vol. Ill, 6.14 
8. Learning Disabilities in School. Mr. Taylor had difficulty in school "doing math and 
English." See Dr. Moench Report, 8. He was placed in special education classes for 
those two subjects. Id. Dr. Moench explained his difficulty in school: "A learning disorder 
despite normal intelligence is the probable explanation for his poor school performance 
and need for special education." Id. at 10. 
9. Prior Diagnoses of Mental health problems. While in the Washington County Jail on 
burglary charges, Mr. Taylor wrote a letter stating, "I (sic) totally going fucking crazy I 
14
 When Rule 23B counsel requested permission to file a motion for competency, the court 
denied that motion finding that a defendant's competency is not relevant during a Rule 23B 
hearing. Rule 23B, VOL. Ill, 50-52. The court accordingly ruled that a defendant did not have a 
right to raise a competency claim during a Rule 23B hearing and refused to consider the issue. 
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want to kill myself to put this out of my life I will confess to anything they want me to 
including last night or any other night for that matter but death sounds good. They say I 
have someone else working with me who knows but my mind, it tells me to die die 
die!!!??? He was prescribed Clonidine, which is a medication used primarily to treat 
hypertension. See Physician's Desk Reference, 56 Edition 2002, p. 1038-40. 
Dr. Moench noted that Dr. Kliarsky of Southwest Mental Health found Mr. Taylor 
to be "extremely paranoid and borderline schizophrenic or depressed and suicidal," all of 
which are evidence of major mental disorders. No one apparently sought the medical 
records from Dr. Kliarsky in the early 1990's, and counsel was informed in 1998 that the 
records pertaining to Mr. Taylor no longer exist.15 The best evidence available at the time 
was that Mr. Taylor suffered from a major mental illness, although no one sought to 
follow-up or investigate those significant diagnoses. 
In 1989, Dr. Long diagnosed Mr. Taylor with Adjustment Disorder with Mixed 
Emotional Features which is "an impairment in occupational functioning, social activities 
or relationships, or may be other reactions in excess of what is normal and expectable for 
the given stressor." See Psychological Evaluation, 8/11/89. Dr. Long noted elevated 
results on the Minnesota Mutiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), Psychological 
Evaluation, at 1, indicating the presence of a "number of mental illnesses and neurological 
conditions." See Affidavit of Dr. Linda Gummow. Dr. Long further described Mr. Taylor 
as "irritable, depressed, and shy . . . ," non-confrontational, "anxious and nervous," and 
"basically passive." Psychological Evaluation at 1. The ninety day diagnostic evaluation 
recommended that Mr. Taylor be placed in the Weber County Drug and Alcohol/Mental 
Health Program as that program was best suited to address Mr. Taylor's drug and alcohol 
and mental health issues. 
In a report written in February, 1991, Dr. Moench concludes that "[t]he random 
property destruction in the cabins around Oakley, and the destruction of human life itself, 
is a level of violence sometimes seen with head injured or otherwise brain damaged 
people." Moench Report, at 11. He rejected that conclusion instead mistakenly believing 
that Mr. Taylor "presents no history of head injury and no evidence for brain impairment. 
. . ," although the doctor concedes that the known learning disabilities present an 
additional clue for brain injury. Despite the clues presented by random property 
destruction and learning disabilities, plus that additional clues of alcohol abuse, head 
injuries, other mental health problems, evidence from family members describing unusual 
conduct, and prior suicide attempts, no one thought to conduct neuropsychiatric testing. 
Dr. Moench nonetheless noted that Mr. Taylor has a History of Adjustment Disorder with 
Depressed Mood, and diagnosed him at that time with a mildly depressed mood, and with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder with Schizoid Personality Features. 
10. Always a Follower. Mr. Taylor's siblings were never interviewed in preparation for 
this case. His siblings are much older than Von, and because of this age difference, helped 
15
 Mitigation expert Mary Goody requested those records in 1998. On September 28, 
1999, she was informed in writing that those records no longer exist. 
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raise him. If interviewed before the penalty phase, they would have described Von as a 
"follower," a person who was easily lead and manipulated. Although they loved their 
brother, each sibling can describe stories where Von was manipulated and nearly always 
lead by others. See Cilwick Affidavit. Testimony of this nature would have been powerful 
mitigation, consistent with the evidence that Edward Deli was the leader and person in 
charge at the time of the homicide. 
11. Mitigation. Mr. Taylor's siblings, if interviewed before the penalty phase, would all 
have offered powerful mitigating evidence. Each would testify that Von was gentle and 
peaceful as a child. He was known for compassion and had no prior history of violence or 
fighting. Each would also testify about personal, loving interactions with their brother in 
circumstances at the farm in Idaho and while the family lived in Utah. See Cilwick 
Affidavit. Because Mr. Taylor had few friends, his siblings provide the most important 
and complete picture of Von. When the siblings were interviewed, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, 
Von's parents, proclaimed that they were unaware of many the stories and antidotes that 
the siblings observed, because his parents were not present during the incidents. No one 
interviewed the siblings prior to the penalty phase. See Cilwick Affidavit. Interestingly, 
the 1989 Presentence Report indicates that "Mr. Taylor has a very supportive family and 
friends," yet none of his extended family or friends were ever interviewed. 
Respondent argues that it was proper for trial counsel to reject these clues in not pursuing 
evidence of brain injury because Mr. Taylor mentioned an interest in devil worshiping during the 
Moench interview. Respondent accordingly reasons that devil worship is somehow admissible as 
an aggravating factor which then converts trial counsel's failure to investigate evidence of brain 
injury into reasonable trial strategy. Admission of evidence in a penalty phase hearing, however, 
is governed by the due process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. State v. 
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985) (the due process clause applies to sentencing proceedings 
and requires that the sentencer rely on reliable information in fixing a sentence); Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). It is unclear how or why an interest in satanic worship would be 
relevant and admissible at penalty phase other than to inflame the passions of jury. See Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (aggravating factors in a death penalty case must be 
"particularly relevant to the sentencing decision, not merely relevant in some generalized sense to 
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